With the start of the year 1942, the Japanese Navy and Army was continuing their conquest of nations in the Pacific and the allies were reeling from their attacks. MacArthur was retreating to the Bataan peninsula in the Philippines and Singapore was being threatened.
In February 1942, the U.S. Navy launched its first offensive strike against the Japanese during World War 2, with the USS ENTERPRISE attacking Kwajalein in the southern Marshalls and the USS YORKTOWN striking Makin in the Gilbert Islands. Bothe ships returned to Pearl Harbor for replenishment.
On February 11, 1942, orders were issued forming Task Force HOW under the command of Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., USN. The carriers USS ENTERPRISE and USS YORKTOWN would form the nucleus of the task force.. The task force’s first target was Wake Island, which had been under enemy control since December 22, 1941.
The first group of Task Force HOW with the USS ENTERPRISE left Pearl Harbor, February 14th, in accordance with orders, and the second group, around the USS YORKTOWN, followed 2 days later. Shortly after leaving Pearl Harbor, the YORKTOWN was redirected to the south Pacific, leaving the ENTERPRISE as the only carrier in the task force.
On February 24, 1942, Task Force 16 (HOW), hit Wake Island. The attack encompassed both aircraft from the USS Enterprise and naval bombardment from the cruisers USS SALT LAKE CITY and USS NORTHAMPTON. A half dozen destroyers provided anti-submarine protection for the Task Group.
TASK FORCE 16 (HOW) COMPOSITION
One carrier:
USS ENTERPRISE, commanded by Capt. George D. Murray. Admiral Halsey was aboard as the Task Force 16s commander.
Two cruisers (Cruiser Division FIVE):
USS NORTHAMPTON, Capt. William D. Chandler;
USS SALT LAKE CITY, Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias;
Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, aboard USS NORTHAMPTON, was the commander of Cruiser Division FIVE.
Seven destroyers: (Destroyer Squadron SIX)
USS BALCH, Commander Charles I. Rend;
USS DUNLAP, Lt. Comdr. Virginius R. Roane;
USS MAURY, Lt. Comdr. Elmer D. Snare;
USS CRAVEN, Lt. Comdr. Allen P. Calvert;
USS McCALL, Commander Frederick Moosbrugger;
USS RALPH TALBOT, Commander Ralph Earle, Jr.;
USS BLUE, Commander Harold N. Williams;
Capt. Richard L. Conolly, commander of Destroyer Squadron SIX, used the USS BALCH, as his flag ship.
Oiler:
USS SABINE, Commander Hugh L. Maples.
At 1822 on the 24th of February, 1942, Task Force 16/HOW turned eastward and retired from the Wake Island area.
The day following the strike, as the task force steamed back toward Pearl Harbor, Task Force HOW’s Admiral Halsey received a message from Admiral Nimitz. It directed the carrier, USS ENTERPRISE, and Cruiser Division FIVE (the USS NORTHAMPTON and USS SALT LAKE CITY) to proceed to a point 175 miles northeast of a small island the Japanese called Minami Torishima, just 1000 miles from mainland Japan and attack it. The destroyers in the TF HOW did not have enough fuel for the diversion and would separate from the task force and rendezvous with the group after the attack.
Not much was known about Minami Torishima. The US had laid claim to the island in the 1800s and had named it MARCUS ISLAND. But the Japanese also claimed the island and by the early 1900s had assumed control of the island, called Minami Torishima by them. In the late 1930s, Japan began to fortify the island and construction of an airfield was begun. Its mission as a Japanese air base was to protect mainland Japan from attacks from the central Pacific.
At the time of the US attack order it was believed that the island was being used as an administrative center by the enemy, and that it contained radio and weather reporting installations. Landplanes had been sighted near it by submarines, indicating an air field was on the island. Little else was known of this island and it lay at extreme range from Hawaii, so plans were drawn up for a quick strike before the entire task force would withdraw to Pearl. Marcus Islans is about 600 miles northwest of Wake Islans on a line leading directly to southern Japan. Enroute, USS ENTERPRISE SBDs on anti-submarine patrol made two attacks on an unidentified submarine. Te target in both instances turned out to be the American USS GUDGEON submarine, heading out on patrol. Luckily the submarine was not damaged.
The attack on Marcus Island was set to take place just 10 minutes before sunrise, at 0710 local time, on Ash Wednesday, March 4 , 1942 (zone minus 11 time) in the expectation that the full moon would provide sufficient light for the launching of planes and for rendezvous. Initially, the strike on Marcus Island would consist of SBD Dauntless bombers only. Then the intelligence officers noted that the island probably has an airfield, so Halsey added some fighters to the strike to provide air support. This change in order of battle required them to wait until they were closer to the island and launch when they were within 125 miles of the island as the fighters did not have the range the SBDs had.
The attack force would consist of 32 SBD Dauntless dive bombers. Bombing Six would provide 18 SBDs and Scouting Six would provide 14 SBD Dauntless bombers. One of the SBDs aircraft would be the personal aircraft of the Enterprise Air Group Commander, Commander Howard L. Young. He would direct the attack just out of range of the anti-aircraft guns of Marcus Island. The bomber and scout planes were armed with one 500-pound (instantaneous fuse) and two 100-pound bombs each. LtCmdr Wade McClusky would lead the six F4F Wildcats to provide fighter protection. A Combat Air Patrol over the Enterprise would have 9 F4Fs Wildcats airborne during the raid.
The goal was to start the attack 10 minutes before sunrise to add the element of surprise to the mission. It was to be a one pass attack for each aircraft, which would then retreat to the southeast over the horizon to confuse the Japanese. Once assembled south east of Marcus, they would then turn north back to the USS ENTERPRISE.
The SBDs of Bombing Six would bomb the airfield and the SBDs of Scouting Six would attack the radio station and other buildings on the island. Cmdr Young, with a photo section of 3 SBDs of Scouting Six would look for ship targets. If any ships were sighted, Torpedo Six, in reserve on the USS Enterprise, would launch to attack the ships. This attack would be the closest to Japan the US had come in making an attack.
Early in the morning of March 4 the USS ENTERPRISE, in company with the USS NORTHAMPTON and USS SALT LAKE CITY, speed 24 knots, was nearing Marcus on course 235°. Because it was desired to include fighters in the attack, launching of planes was delayed until the ships were about 125 miles from the island. At 0438 the Enterprise changed her course into the wind and a few minutes later the first plane was launched. The sky was about nine tenths overcast with a heavy cumulus layer running from 4,000 to 10,000 feet. Winds aloft were strong southerly and on the surface 8 knots from 170°. The sea was calm. There was a full moon, elevation about 30°, which provided considerable illumination above the clouds, but left it comparatively dark below. The sky to the east was beginning to lighten at the time of the attack, twenty-three minutes before sunrise.
Take offs were started at 0445 with Cmdr Young in the first SBD. The rest of Scouting Six would follow, then the SBDs of Bombing Six. The F4Fs were the last to take off, with the last fighter off by 0504 L. Overhead the ship the aircraft assembled with the aid of a full moon. The attack group, led by Cmdr Young, departed the rendezvous area at 0526 and took up a heading of 251 degrees toward Marcus Island, about 128 miles away. One plane, an F4F, the last to take off, could not find the formation. He did not have the navigation equipment to fly to Marcus alone and could not break radio silence to let the ENTERPRISE know he was returning. So, he circled out of the ENTERPRISE’S gun range until daybreak, then returned to land.
The carrier USS ENTERPRISE and her two escorting cruisers immediately turned to the northeast on a heading of 070 degrees and increased speed to 25 knots to put some distance between itself and Marcus Island.
Cmdr Young led the strike group to the south in a gradual climb up to a freezing 16,000 feet. Heavy cloud cover was noted ahead of them, over the area where Marcus Island lay. None of the aircraft had radar and they were navigating by dead reckoning. However, the USS ENTERPRISE tracked the group on her radar and were able to direct the group by using the voice mode of the ship’s YE homing transmitter. ENTERPRISE told Young he was five miles north of course and he corrected toward the island.
The closer the formation approached in the darkness and moonlight, the deeper the overcast grew. The group climbed steadily and went up through a large hole in the overcast, continuing on top until at 0630 the objective was sighted through a hole in the overcast. The dawn, as it started to break, was spectacular. The sky was appropriately bloody red.
They were about 30 minutes early due to a higher tailwind plus they left earlier as they were able to assemble quickly. However, the white runways of Marcus were very easily seen in the moonlit darkness and low hanging clouds. Young decided to attack early as he was afraid the Japanese would be warned by the aircraft’s engine noise.
Once the island was sighted, “nestling in the moonlight,” the order to attack from an altitude of 16,000 feet was given.
The surprise was complete. Diving in, Bombing Six dropped several parachute flares to illuminate the targets. At least four bombs were dropped before any antiaircraft fire was noticed Several hits were scored which cratered the runway and demolished a suspected hangar. A Japanese radio on Marcus Island blared a warning until an American bomb silenced the transmitter.
The Air Group Commander, Cdr Young, noted the two intact runways and was uncertain whether there were any Japanese aircraft parked unseen on them. He called LtCdr McClusky to direct him to strafe the field but radio problems prevented McClusky from receiving the radio call.
One F4F did hear the call and answered Cdr Young. Young directed the aircraft, flown by Lt Jim Gray, to check out the field for Japanese aircraft. So, Gray dropped down low and buzzed the runway. He did not see any Japanese aircraft.
The 17 SBD s of Bombing Squadron 6 separated into three divisions and began high speed approaches from the south and west.
The dives varied in steepness from 045° to 070°, with final dives entered at from 8,000 to 10,000 feet, releases at 3,000 to 2,000 feet in ripple drops, and pull-outs at 1,000 feet with a continued power glide retirement. One plane was detached from the first section just before the attack to reconnoiter the island and broadcast any information available concerning planes on the field or other objectives. Limited strafing was conducted both in the dive and during retirement, the fixed .50-caliber and the flexible .30-caliber machine guns being used. Withdrawal was made to the southeast until out of sight contact. Planes returned in small groups to the carrier and were landed aboard at 0845.
The fourteen SBD Dauntlesses of Scouting Squadron 6 followed immediately, some of its planes making a conventional dive bombing attack, approaching from 15,000 feet and entering final dive at about 10,000, while others dived through the clouds and then executed a glide attack. VS-6 scored additional direct hits on a radio building, but anti-aircraft fire was heavy which forced the pilots to escape the area quickly with little opportunity to assess bomb damage.
At 0705 the pilot, Lt. (j.g.) Hart D. Hilton, of one SBD, BuNo 2152, reported that his plane was badly hit by a shell and was on fire. He was forced to ditch 10 miles east of Marcus. Lt. Richard H. Best (Bombing Squadron SIX) stated that he saw Hilton’s plane land in the sea about 10 miles east of Marcus, and that the pilot and gunner manned their rubber boat, waved and gave a “thumbs up” signal before he departed from the scene. The crew, with pilot Lt. (j.g.) Hart D. Hilton, and gunner RM2c Jack Leaming, was soon picked up by a Japanese patrol boat, and brought back to Marcus Island. They were then sent by cargo ship to the mainland where they spent the next three years in captivity.
McClusky and the 3 remaining F4Fs followed the last SBDs in, then circled at 5,000 feet just southeast of Marcus to cover their withdrawal. Between 0837 and 0907, the ENTERPRISE landed35 aircraft. Only one SBD and one fighter had failed to return. The ships immediately changed course to 050°, speed 25 knots to depart the area. At 0940, they increased to 30 knots.
After buzzing the island, Lt Gray, in the lone F4F, realized he was alone and did not know where he was. He proceeded back in the direction of the ENTERPRISE by himself. Hopelessly lost in the overcast and his radio acting up, he flew a couple of hours in search of the ships. Down to his last 20 gallons of fuel, the cold seas beckoned for him. However, aboard the ENTERPRISE, the radar officer Lt John Baumeister, had been watching the unknown bogey on their radar. The bogey had come from the direction of Marcus Island and had flown past the ships, which were hidden by low hanging clouds. The bogey continued northward, away from the ships. Realizing the bogey might be Gray, Baumeister received permission to broadcast a short radio message to him with the correct course back to the carrier. at 0956, Gray landed on the ENTERPRISE after a flight of 5 1/2 hours, with only 9 gallons of gas left aboard.
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The capture of Lt. (j.g.) Hart D. Hilton, and gunner RM2c Jack Leaming
Lt Hilton was able to ditch the aircraft successfully about 10 miles east of Marcus Island. The Japanese sent a boat out to recover the two crewmembers. RM2c Leaming remembers “When they came alongside our rubber boat, two of them reached down to help us aboard their boat. Neither of us could understand what they were saying to us. Never having been exposed to any foreign language but three years of Spanish that I had taken in high school, the Japanese language was very, very strange.To be ordered to do something in an unlearned language by a man with a rifle with a fixed bayonet, inches from your belly, is not a pleasant feeling. Staring at death is a sensation that is extremely difficult to accept because you are looking into eyes that are looking into yours, that seem to reflect the same feelings you are experiencing. Anger. Confusion. Consternation. Perplexity. It is different than being helpless in a burning man-made contrivance. I did not want to accept it, but to avoid death obeyed and did my best to interpret what was being demanded as the bayonet moved back and forth and up and down, prodding me in the direction I was being told to go in a language I could not understand. Their orders must have been to take us prisoner and not kill us.Because I was an enlisted man and they probably assumed I would be more cooperative most of the questions were directed to me, initially.
“What ship were you on?”
“USS Yorktown.”
“How many ships?”
“Three.” They undoubtedly knew, because of the remoteness of Marcus, we had to be from a carrier. Which one could be important to them. The last I knew the USS Yorktown was in the Atlantic. So, that would be the carrier from whence we came. I just was not going to tell these SOBs the truth. The hell with them!The questioning was brief. Upon completion, we were blindfolded again and placed in the truck. We were taken to our quarters. How elite! A room about eight foot square, cement floor with one half of it about four inches higher than the remainder, walls half cement and half wood. No door knob on the inside and damp as hell. A piece of canvas, a tarp, was spread over a wooden pallet … our bed. No chairs. It must have been the Japanese Navy’s version of the brig. They took all our belongings and gave us dry clothing. A white jumpsuit, typical Japanese sailor work clothing.As the day wore on, it became obvious to the Japanese there would be no more attacks. When they relaxed, some men on the Island were free to satisfy their curiosity. There was a small window in the door that provided the frequent and curious visitors the opportunity to see their American attackers. The door could be opened from the outside but not from the inside. The guards that we had were very friendly. They brought us candy and cigarettes and talked with us most of the time. It seemed strange that they wanted to be so friendly after what we had done.“
After some questioning, both aviators were placed aboard the Japanese ship —— and were sent to mainland Japan where they spent the war in captivity.
http://www.cv6.org/company/accounts/jleaming/default.htm
https://www.ww2online.org/view/jack-leaming#joining-the-uss-enterprise-cv-6
Although no enemy aircraft was encountered in the air or sighted on the ground or water, the antiaircraft fire, coming presumably from 3-inch guns located on each point of the island, was sufficiently heavy to prevent close inspection of the damage done. The spotting plane, however, witnessed a hit on and subsequent fire in what looked like a fuel storage tank. Several buildings or hangars on both sides of the field were on fire and several explosions at short intervals occurred in one group. Two large fires visible from 20 to 30 miles were still burning fiercely at 0705, as well as numerous smaller fires. Unfortunately, considerably fewer objectives were found than had been anticipated. No photographs could be obtained due to darkness and clouds. By 8 o’clock the planes had returned to the Enterprise,
which, with the Northampton and Salt Lake City was already steaming eastward at 25 knots.
A Japanese airplane flying from Iwo Jima in the Kazan Rettō (Volcano Islands) reached the Marcus Island area toward the end of the raid and radioed a further warning to the Japanese. Japanese submarine I-15, Cmdr. Ishikawa Nobuo, sighted some of Halsey’s ships as they cancelled a planned rendezvous with TG 16.9 and returned on 7 March, but Ishikawa failed to maneuver to a favorable attack position.
Foul weather again masked the carrier as she withdrew, and it also gave the tired aviators a chance to rest with air operations impossible to conduct. Drawing on the lessons of the cruise, commanders again noted a lack of fighters. Increased deliveries of fighters, including the upgraded F4F-4 with folding wings, would allow an increase in the allowance of fighters on Pacific Fleet carriers from 18 to 27 aircraft, but it would take time to organize the extra planes and pilots to affect this change. Also noted was a need to provide external, droppable fuel tanks for fighters in order to extend the range of the short-legged Wildcat. The provision of a working ZB receiver for the carrier-based YE homing equipment, together with rigorous training for all pilots, was deemed essential and the installation of this equipment was made mandatory in all new carrier aircraft. However, these changes would take time to implement, and the rapidly developing situation in the South and Central Pacific would not give the carrier force much chance to adjust.
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BOMBING SQUADRON SIX ACTION REPORT – Marcus Island Raid – 4 March 1942
- At 0640, 4 March 1942, this squadron participated in an attack on Marcus Island.
- Bombing Squadron SIX’s tactical organization was as follows:
- FIRST DIVISION
- 6-B-1Lt-Cdr. W.R. Hollingsworth; MURRAY, J.F., ACRM(PA)
- 6-B-16Lt. H.P. Lanham; GARAUDY, E.J., ARM2c
- 6-B-3Lt. L.A. Smith; CARUTHERS, H.H., AMM2c
- 6-B-7Lt. J.W. McCauley; BOYD, B.W., AMM2c
- 6-B-14Ensign C.R. Walters; THOMPSON, W.T., AMM2c
- 6-B-9Ensign A.L. Rausch; HALTERMAN, G.W., RM3c
- SECOND DIVISION
- 6-B-10Lt. R.H. Best; NELSON, H.W., ARM1c
- 6-B-15Lt(jg) E.L. Anderson; JENKINS, J.W., RM3c
- 6-B-12Ensign W.E. Roberts; SHEA, J.H., AMM1c
- 6-B-8Lt(jg) J.J. Van Buren; GEORGIOU, A.A., RM3c,
- V-36-B-17Ensign K.H. Holcomb; WELCH, L.E., AMM2c
- 6-B-18Ensign T.W. Ramsay; DUNCAN, S.L., AMM3c
- THIRD DIVISION
- 6-B-4Lt. J.D. Blitch; STEINMAN, W.B., AMM2c6-B-5
- Ensign N.F. Vandivier; MASON, S.J., ARM2c
- 6-B-6Ensign T.F. Schneider; HOLDEN, G.L., RM3c
- 6-B-13Lt. J.R. Penland; HEARD, H.F., ARM2c,
- V-36-S-18 Ensign D.W. Halsey; JOHNSON, P.S., ARM2c
- Limited strafing was conducted both in the dive and during retirement using the fixed .50 caliber and the flexible .30 caliber machine guns. The primary weapons were the one 500 lb bomb and two 100 lb bombs per plane. Enemy large caliber anti-aircraft was very limited and was apparently from three inch guns. There was however a large volume of rapid-fire A.A. that was of a caliber 20 or 37 mm, or 1.1 inch. This smaller caliber fire was much more accurate than any previously encountered and at times came uncomfortably close. Planes retiring when as far as five miles away saw tracers close aboard. The island was well ringed with these light batteries, but with the strongest concentrations at the three corners of the island.
- During the approach the dark sky to the westward and cloud concealment were the only protective measures employed. During retirement planes made frequent, irregular, and radical changes of course and altitude.
- Ammunition expended was as follows:500 lb bombs, Mk.12 2.100 sec. delay fuse- 17100 lb bombs Mk.4, 2/100 sec. delay fuse- 34Machine gun ammunition loaded in the ration of 70% AP and 30% tracer,.50 caliber- 200 rds.30 caliber- 100 rds
- Because heavy A.A. fire made it inadvisable to pull up and turn around until well out to sea, it is almost impossible to adjudge damage. The spotting plane witnessed a hit on and subsequent fire in what appeared to be a fuel storage tank. Several buildings or hangars on both sides of the field were on fire and several explosions at short intervals occurred in one group. Two large fires visible from twenty to thirty miles were still burning brightly at 0705, as well as numerous smaller fires. No aircraft on the field were definitely identified as such, but from the location of the various fires and the spread of bomb hits it is believed that the majority of any aircraft on the ground would have been destroyed.
- No damage was sustained by own aircraft.
- No deficiencies in own aircraft armament or equipment were noted. The field appeared to be under construction and in no way compared to those seen at Taroa and Roi.
| (Signed) W.R. HOLLINGSWORTH. |
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https://www.youtube.com/embed/18vXH-NOJAE?feature=oembed
6 March 1942: In response to the raid, the Japanese blacked out the lights of Tokyo for several nights. The Japanese Carrier IJN ZUIKAKU departed Kure for Marcus Island area to attempt to intercept VADM W.F. Halsey’s TF 16 after its raid. It was unsuccessful.
REFERENCES:
Early Raids in the Pacific Ocean
February 1 to March 10, 1942
Naval History and Heritage Command
U.S. Navy
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